An unappreciated merit of counterfactual histories of science.
This paper critically engages with Ian Hesketh's (2016) analysis of counterfactual histories of science. According to such analysis, extant counterfactual histories-especially of biology-have a rather conservative flavor, since due to the authors' concern for plausibility, they typically converge on actual science, in the sense that their endpoints coincide with (or are very similar to) those of the corresponding actual scientific developments. As a result, Hesketh argues, not only does the ambition-often proclaimed-to exhibit the centrality of contingency in history of science remain unfulfilled: counterfactual narratives in the history of biology also end up with valuing the past in view of its contribution to the establishment of present-day science. Contrary to this analysis, we contend that an unappreciated merit of counterfactual histories of science converging on actual science lies in the fact that they put present science in a different light, since by being approached from a counterfactual angle, differing from established history, present-day science appears in a new perspective.